Category Archives: Boston bombing

Why We Need to Switch to a Risk-Based Security Model – School Stabbing at Franklin Regional, Active Shooter Incidents at Fort Hood (twice), LAX, and The Washington Navy Yard.

When I turned on the news today, I was in the middle of writing an article on the 2nd Shooting
at Ft. Hood from last week, and then saw that there had been a violent knife attack at a
Pennsylvania high school, with 20 casualties and at least eight injured critically, the next day,
there was a hate crime shooting at the Jewish community center in Overland Park, Kansas.

Once again, we see violence on a mass scale, the FBI has been brought in, and next will come
information on the victims.   With two major events, in two weeks, what can we deduce about the
security in place at both Franklin Regional High School, Pennsylvania, and Fort Hood, Texas.

        NEWS FLASH:   THE CURRENT SECURITY MODEL IS NOT WORKING!

CURRENT SECURITY MODELS

Disaster preparedness is improving,  Emergency Management is working, but security is
still not where it needs to be.  It is a systemic problem based on the fact that security around
the U.S. is still locked in a REACTIVE mode, not a PROACTIVE mode.

The main reason for this reactive mode in security organizations, is because most security
officers come from a law enforcement background, with a model which is based on crimes
and arrests, and it is totally REACTIVE.  A crime happens and police officers go into action
and arrest the perpetrator(s).

CRIME HAPPENS    =    PERP IS IDENTIFIED    =   PERP IS ARRESTED

Unfortunately, this reactive model does not work for preventing security incidents and mass violence
because it is INCIDENT DRIVEN, not Risk-Driven.  It focuses on individuals, not on a more holistic,
generalized view of Threats, and it totally leaves Solutions (Controls) out of the equation.

After studying pages of after action reviews, post-incident analyses and media sources, the one
recommendation that makes sense is that organizations need to switch to a RISK-BASED,
PROACTIVE mode for security to work
.

This was highlighted in a remark made by a Pentagon official, commenting on the 2nd Fort Hood
Shooting on April 2, and the fact that new DOD recommendations for security, had just been released.

“After the Navy Yard shooting in September 2013, another round of recommendations were made
to improve security at all DOD installations, however, a  Pentagon official said that the new
recommendations had not yet been put into effect at Fort Hood.
 At Fort Hood, very little 
had
changed from 2009
regarding security procedures for soldiers at the entrance gates.”

The question for the Department of Defense is “how could this happen again at the same military
base?  
I took extra time to study the 89-page document called An Independent Review “Protecting
the Force
”, one of 3 reports created after the initial Fort Hood Shooting, whene 13 were killed, and
43 injured.

If you look at the recommendations, they are very bureaucratic and procedural.  They could have
been written by an efficiency expert, not by anyone with a background in security, and covered things
like policy changes, and having screening for clergy and psychologists, and improved mental health
programs.   These are all important, but they do not provide a secure environment.

The LAX after action analysis’ Number One recommendation was to change
the security focus to a Risk-Based approach
.

 


RISK-BASED SECURITY

The problem with a reactive approach is that you can’t screen and lock down everyone. At Fort
Hood, for example, there are 80,000 individuals living on the base, and probably hundreds of
visitors who go in and out every day.  It’s impossible to assess the mental health, and the
‘intentions’ of all of them.

FortHoodAmbulances-Medium

That’s why a Risk-Based Approach works – because it focuses on the potential threats and then evaluates the existing controls to see whether they offer the required amount of protection based on the likelihood of the threat occurring.

You stop violent events by controlling access and by controlling weapons.  No matter how unpopular they are, you use metal detectors at certain points, you use security officers at key entrances, you control entrances and exits.

Once the event starts, you can improve security by having faster notification (panic alarms), ability
to block, or disable weapons and attackers, adequate transport, better emergency response, but to
avoid the violence, you need to have strong access control.

The Risk-Based approach makes use of annual risk assessments that are holistic in nature. They
are not done in stovepipes, they include the entire organizations, they include input from staff
members, visitors, students, vendors, soldiers, patients on how they see security from their point
of view, which is always dramatically different from management or administration.

A risk-based approach requires an organization to:

  • Define potential security risks.
  • Develop standardized risk assessment processes, for gathering and
    analyzing information, and use of analytical technology
  • Risk-Based Security focuses on PREVENTION OF NEW INCIDENTS
    whether they are active shooter, general violence, etc.
  • Enhances security’s ability to rapidly respond  to changes in the threat environment.

MORE BANG FOR THE BUCK

According the LAX (LAWA) after action report, “Simply adding more security does not
necessarily provide better security.
  Determining priorities and where to achieve great
value for the dollars invested requires regular, systematic assessment of the likelihood
and consequences (risks) associated with a range of threat scenarios that morph and
change more quickly now than ever before. 

Collaborative engagement in a security risk assessment process across the community builds
the buy-in needed to develop and sustain a holistic security program over time. Leaders must
be open to challenging established practices and demonstrate a willingness to change direction”
.

Making the switch to a Risk-Based security program is the best recommendation for those who
want to protect their staff, students, patients, vendors, clients, soldiers, and visitors from a mass
casualty event, or for all the organizations who don’t want to have a terrible incident happen in
the first place!

 Caroline Hamilton, friend of Patty Garitty (Soup Kitchen voluteer)

Caroline Ramsey-Hamilton

President, Risk and Security LLC

Caroline@riskandsecurityllc.com

 

www.securityinfowatch.com/blogs

www.riskandsecurityllc.com

Why the FBI and DHS Need Google’s Help to Track Potential Terrorists

The Boston Marathon bombings were bad enough.  The loss of life was terrible, but the runners and their families who lost legs and feet because they wanted to give their Dad a hug at the finish line were worse.

One week later, we all watch with trepidation as the first bomber is killed and the second captured bleeding in a boat in Watertown.

THE MOST TERRIBLE NEWS OF ALL IS THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED!!  This is EXACTLY the situation that DHS was supposed to catch.  This is EXACTLY why the agencies were ORDERED to share information, and still these guys can tweet all they want, show violent Islamic videos on their web sites and call for Jihad and NOBODY NOTICES!!

This is made even more incomprehensible because the U.S. government was ALERTED BY THE RUSSIANS that one of them was DANGEROUS.

What do we need to do to get these agencies to start paying attention to these potential terrorists?  DO WE NEED TO MAKE THEM WEAR A RED SHIRT?

If the IRS can keep track of every American and in 2 minutes call up their entire history of taxes, and the Department of Labor can calculate your benefit rates in less than 1 minute, and Social Security keep track of all your information – why can’t DHS and the FBI  keep a contact database current?

Why can’t they have a person who scans these web sites and Facebook sites for Jihadist pages and then cross-references them with the site’s owner?   Why can’t a trip to a violent region of the world trigger a PING, as I heard one congressman call it.

Every company in the world has a simple Contact database on their own customers and suppliers that gives them years of data.   WHY CAN’T WE BE PROTECTED FROM THESE TERRORiSTS.

This one wasn’t hiding in the shadows – he was ON SOCIAL MEDIA!   He wasn’t locked up in a cabin – he was traveling internationally,   his brother was getting a scholarship.  And they did this FOR YEARS!!

This intelligence failure is just exactly like 9/11 all over again.  These agencies are so procedural that they cannot connect the dots.  Ok – they’re human. But we have super computers that CAN connect the dots and do profiles and create alerts…

Maybe we should call Google and get some help.  We obviously need it.

 

 

Tragedy at the Boston Marathon – What Went Wrong?

Looking at the CNN footage of the Boston Marathon finish line yesterday, I was struck by the shock of the bystanders and the chaos that followed the blasts.

Having just giving two seminars on security controls, I pulled out my list to see what could possibly have been done differently to prevent this devastating outcome, and there was the first word on the list ACCESS CONTROL.

After thirty years as a security expert and risk-threat analyst, I am about 85% sure that this was a lone wolf attacker who made his crude bombs to address some personal perceived problem, whether it was fear of gun legislation, spillover from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Neo Con torture initiative, or something else.

Putting the attacker aside for a moment, the tragedy happened because SOMEONE WAS ABLE TO WALK RIGHT UP TO THE FINISH LINE AND PUT AT LEAST 3 BOMBS right near the finish line!   THiS IS NOT RIGHT.

There has to be SCREENING and ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES IN PLACE!  You can’t have security if you have open access to a major event like the Boston Marathon.  For year, security experts have cautioned that large crowds make a great target, and so events have paid lip service to this concept, without staying on the task, and making sure that SECURITY CONTROL NUMBER ONE –  ACCESS CONTROL  is ALWAYS in place.

But people don’t like access control, it’s too much trouble, they say.  They don’t like metal detectors, too expensive, too much trouble, too intrusive.  Well, it’s not as intrusive as having a major injury.   There are ways to secure these high profile sites, but the security community has to lead on this.

Yes, it is very sad and depressing that the world has come to this — but it has.  And it will happen again.  As long as security is perceived as too much trouble, too expensive, too tough to do, and too intrusive, there will be more tragic events like this one.